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Threat Actor Characterization

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Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian

Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian

ID: 8e1b51115cf9f23a27dc1e40755faace18409
Cybercrime Cyber Espionage Cybercriminal Hacktivist
Threat types: Hacktivism, OT/ICS Targeting
Iran IRL, ISR, USA
Updated: 2026-03-21
Created: 2026-03-20
Progress: 82% Completeness: 78% Freshness: 90%
Operation zone: Ireland, Israel, United States
Aliases Limited alias preview
Saberian
Actor Network Graph
Open Network Graph
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MITRE ATT&CK®

Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian is a publicly named senior official of Iran's IRGC-CEC. Public reporting ties him to the command environment behind CyberAv3ngers-linked critical infrastructure activity, but does not provide strong evidence of him as an individually documented hands-on operator.


Technique Technique name Tactics Evidence
T1078.001 Default Accounts TA0001 TA0003 TA0004 TA0005
  • 2023-12-01 — Joint advisory on CyberAv3ngers activity states that exposed Unitronics PLCs were compromised through default passwords. INFERENCE (confidence: medium-high): As a named senior IRGC-CEC official, Saberian is relevant to the command structure associated with this tradecraft. · ref
  • 2024-05-30 — Microsoft described a repeated OT attack methodology centered on internet-exposed devices and weak/default credentials in the Storm-0784 / CyberAv3ngers ecosystem. · ref
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application TA0001
  • 2024-05-30 — Microsoft highlighted focus on internet-exposed OT devices and reachable management surfaces. INFERENCE (confidence: medium): Ecosystem activity around Saberian includes exploitation or abuse of public-facing OT/IoT access paths. · ref
  • 2025-06-05 — OpenAI reported CyberAv3ngers-linked accounts researching vulnerabilities, industrial protocols, public-facing technologies, and scripting for vulnerable infrastructure discovery. · ref
T1491.001 Internal Defacement TA0040
  • 2023-12-01 — Joint advisory documented hostile messaging displayed on compromised Unitronics HMIs. INFERENCE (confidence: medium-high): Visible interface defacement is part of the operational environment tied to Saberian's command ecosystem. · ref
T1565.001 Stored Data Manipulation TA0040
  • 2023-12-01 — Advisory described controller renaming and manipulation of device-side content/behavior. This aligns with stored data or configuration manipulation on compromised devices. · ref
T1587.001 Malware TA0042
  • 2024-12-10 — Claroty linked IOCONTROL malware to the CyberAv3ngers ecosystem. INFERENCE (confidence: medium): As a named IRGC-CEC senior official, Saberian is relevant to a command structure associated with internally developed or maintained malware capabilities. · ref
T1583.001 Domains TA0042
  • 2024-02-26 — Microsoft described public personas and influence-linked branding in the wider Storm-0784 ecosystem. INFERENCE (confidence: low-medium): The underlying command environment likely acquires or maintains supporting domains/infrastructure for campaign operations and public messaging. · ref
Strategic Intelligence
Limited preview
Last updated: 2026-03-21T02:57:16+00:00

Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian — IRGC-CEC senior official linked to CyberAv3ngers

Classification: Unclassified / Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) — TLP:WHITE

Category: State cyber official / command-enablement profile - Origin: Iran

Author: iQBlack CTI Team


Executive Summary

Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian is publicly identified by the U.S. Department of the Treasury as a senior official of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). Public U.S. government material does not provide a detailed biography, role title, or individually attributed intrusion history for Saberian. The strongest defensible assessment is therefore institutional rather than personal: he is part of the command structure publicly linked to malicious cyber operations against critical infrastructure through the CyberAv3ngers persona.


The operational significance of Saberian comes from his location inside the IRGC-CEC ecosystem at the time that CyberAv3ngers activity became a major public concern, particularly the compromise of internet-exposed Unitronics PLCs and the broader Iran-linked OT/ICS targeting narrative that followed. Public reporting and later research tie that ecosystem to weak/default credential abuse, public defacement and intimidation, and, in later reporting, the IOCONTROL malware family targeting OT/IoT/Linux-based platforms.

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Executive Analyst Brief for CISO
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Executive Analyst Brief for CISO — Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian


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Hunting Playbook
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Hunting Playbook — Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian


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IOC Appendix
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Last updated: 2026-03-21T03:04:53+00:00

IOC Appendix — Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian

Scope & Caveats. This appendix is intentionally conservative. Publicly available information on Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian is primarily institutional and sanctions-oriented, not sample-rich or personally infrastructure-rich. As a result, most hard indicators below are linked to the IRGC-CEC / CyberAv3ngers operational ecosystem rather than to Saberian as an individually observed operator.

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OSINT Library
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Last saved: 2026-03-21T03:05:06+00:00

OSINT Library — Reza Mohammad Amin Saberian


2024-02-02 — U.S. Department of the Treasury — “Treasury Sanctions Actors Responsible for Malicious Cyber Activities on Critical Infrastructure”

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Social Medial & Communication
SOCMINT integrated: 0/0

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Reference Images/Associated Evidence Limited

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